

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06352 01 OF 02 201233Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----115202 201235Z /43

O 201108Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2401

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 6352

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, KS, US

SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT TO SEOUL BY CONGRESSMEN HAMILTON AND SPENCE

REF: A) SEOUL 6293; B) STATE 182550; C) GLEYSTEN/

HOLBROOKE TELCON 7/20/78 (SEOUL TIME)

1. AT MY REQUEST I AGAIN MET WITH FORMIN AT HIS RESIDENCE LATE AFTERNOON JULY 20 AND PRESENTED HIM AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE LETTER WHICH WOULD BE DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT PARK BY CONGRESSMEN HAMILTON AND SPENCE IF THEIR VISIT COULD BE ARRANGED. I EXPLAINED THAT FOLLOWING WASHINGTON RECEIPT OF MY REPORT ON OUR MEETING OF THE PREVIOUS DAY I HAD BEEN CALLED EARLY THIS MORNING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ACTING SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WHO HAD JUST MET WITH SPEAKER O'NEILL. I HAD BEEN ASKED TO STRESS THAT THE VISITING CONGRESSMEN WOULD WISH TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AND NOTHING MORE. THEY WOULD NOT COME TO DELIVER ULTIMATA OR THREATEN FURTHER PUNITIVE ACTION BY THE CONGRESS BUT RATHER TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THE IMPORTANCE CONGRESS PLACES UPON THIS MATTER AND THE DIFFICULTY WHICH IT PRESENTS. THEY ARE FULLY AWARE THAT THERE ARE NO LEVERAGES OPEN TO THEM WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER THE CONGRESS IS AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE AND THE TWO CONGRESSMEN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06352 01 OF 02 201233Z

ARE PREPARED TO ARRIVE BY THE AFTERNOON MONDAY, JULY 24 BY COMMERCIAL CARRIER. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE SOMEWHAT EARLIER BY SPECIAL MILITARY AIRCRAFT BUT NOTED THIS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE VISIBILITY OF THE VISIT. WHILE I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY EXACTLY WHAT THE CONGRESSMEN WOULD SAY I ASSURED THE FORMIN THAT THEY HAVE BEEN BRIEFED

ON THE ROKG POSITION AND THE FACT THAT IT'S PREVIOUS
OFFER REMAINED OPEN.

2. I EXPLAINED TO THE FORMIN THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP CONSIDERED IT OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE
THAT THIS VISIT TAKE PLACE. SHOULD THE DOOR BE SLAMMED
ON THIS INITIATIVE, THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED
THAT IT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ATTITUDE OF
CONGRESSMEN ON FUTURE LEGISLATION OF IMPORTANCE TO
KOREA AND WOULD LEAVE A LINGERING SOUR-TASTE ON CAPITAL HILL.
I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW
THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT
THIS CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE. IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER
TO HAVE THEM COME EVEN--AND WE HOPE THIS WOULD NOT BE
THE CASE--IF ONLY TO HAVE THE POSITION OF THE ROKG
AS IT STANDS TODAY RESTATED.

3. I THEN INFORMED THE FORMIN THAT HIS COMMENT, THAT
THE ROKG WOULD ENCOURAGE KIM DONG-JO TO RESPOND FULLY
IF QUESTIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO HIM AND THAT THE OUTCOME
WOULD BE DIFFERENT THAN THE NEWSWEEK ARTICLE, HAD BEEN
FAVORABLY NOTED IN WASHINGTON. THE CONGRESS
WOULD ALSO BE AWARE OF THIS POSITION. WHEN THE
VISIT TOOK PLACE THIS WOULD BE EXACTLY THE TYPE OF
FORMULATION WHICH WOULD PUT THE ROK POSITION IN THE
BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. RATHER THAN VIEW THE VISIT IN A
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 06352 01 OF 02 201233Z

NEGATIVE SENSE, I URGED HIM TO SEE IT AS SOMETHING WHICH
WOULD NOT HURT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, WOULD LOWER
TENSION WITH RESPECT TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE HOUSE, AN
WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO EXPLAIN DIRECTLY
TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THAT LEADERSHIP THE ROKG POSITION.
IN CONCLUSION, I EMPHASIZED AT SOME LENGTH
THE SOUNDNESS OF THE TWO CONGRESSMEN SELECTED FOR
THIS MISSION.

4. FORMIN SAID THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBLE
RESPONSE WHICH COULD BE MADE TO A DIRECT REQUEST TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR INTERVENTION IN THE KIM DONG-JO AFFAIR.
HE STRESSED AGAIN THE BASIC WILLINGNESS OF THE ROKG
TO COOPERATE WITH THE CONGRESS, WHICH HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR
FROM THE BEGINNING, WITHIN THE LIMITS WHICH EXIST. GIVEN
THIS POSITION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW TO FRAME A
RESPONSE TO A REQUEST WHICH IS AS YET UNCLEAR. I TOLD
HIM THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO HAVE A LONG MEETING
AND THE BASIC REQUEST WOULD BE FOR THE MAXIMUM COOPERATION
THE ROKG CAN PROVIDE IN THIS MATTER. THE CONGRESSMEN
ARE COMING AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP
TO INDICATE THE DEGREE OF CONCERN THAT EXISTS, TO

DEMONSTRATE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS THIS MATTER
POSES FOR THE ROKG, AND TO ASK THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS
ASSISTANCE. THEY INTEND ONLY THIS AND WILL LEAVE ONCE IT
HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THERE IS NO INTENTION TO ATTEMPT
ANY NEGOTIATION WHILE IN SEOUL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06352 02 OF 02 201311Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----115616 201314Z /46

O 201108Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEIDATE 2402

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 6352

NODIS

5. THE FORMIN SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE NEED
OF THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC THAT IT MADE ITS MAXIMUM EFFORT TO SOLVE THIS
MATTER. HE ASKED, IN LIGHT OF THE ROKG POSITION, IF
THIS WERE NOT AN ELEMENT IN THE PROPOSED TRIP. I RESPONDED
THAT THE CONGRESS WISHED TO EXPLORE EVERY
POSSIBLE AVENUE FOR SOLUTION AND TO BE SURE THAT ALL
AVAILABLE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE ASKED IF THE RESULTS
OF THE VISIT, WHATEVER THEY MIGHT BE, COULD BE CONSIDERED
AS PUTTING AN END TO THIS MATTER. I EXPLAINED MY
UNDERSTANDING THAT BOTH HOUSES FELT THE NEED TO MAKE A
REPORT BEFORE ADJOURNMENT AND WERE MAKING EVERY EFFORT
TO END THE MATTER. THE FORMIN PRESSED FURTHER ASKING
IF THE VISIT WOULD SATISFY THE CONGRES. I EXPLAINED
THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE TREATED AS A SINGLE UNIT, BUT IS
MADE UP OF INDIVIDUALS HAVING DIFFERENT SATISFACTION
LEVELS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP IF THE
CONGRESSMEN CAN MAKE THIS VISIT, HOLD THE DISCUSSION
WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND THEN RETURN WITH THE BELIEF
THAT THEY HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

6. FORMIN SAID THAT EVEN IF IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO SEE
THE PRESIDENT, HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE ROKG POSITION
WOULD BE SIMILAR TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PRESENTED.
I EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THIS POSITION AND

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06352 02 OF 02 201311Z

SAID THAT I WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO WASHINGTON. EVEN SO, I STILL STRONGLY PRESSED FOR THE MEETING, ASSURING THE FORMIN THAT NO TWO CONGRESSMEN COULD HAVE BEEN SELECTED WHO WOULD HANDLE THE MATTER MORE RESPONSIBLY THAN THE TWO WHO HAVE BEEN PROPOSED.

7. FORMIN ASKED, IF THE PRESIDENT HAD DEPARTED FOR HIS ANNUAL VACATION, WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE CONGRESSMEN TO MEET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASKED WHAT THE REACTION TO THIS WOULD BE. I EXPLAINED THAT I WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO REFER TO WASHINGTON FOR A REPLY. HOWEVER, I SAID THAT IT WAS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE REQUEST THAT THIS MATTER BE TREATED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. I AGREED HOWEVER TO SEEK WASHINGTON CLARIFICATION ON THIS POINT.

8. THE FORMIN AGAIN STATED THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE DESIRE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT HAD MADE ITS BEST EFFORT IN THIS MATTER AND THAT IN THAT LIGHT HE COULD SEE SOME POSITIVE REASON FOR THE VISIT. HE STRESSED THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE A COMMITMENT AT THIS POINT AND WOULD HAVE TO GIVE THE MATTER FURTHER STUDY BEFORE MAKING A FORMAL REPLY. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE INITIAL REACTION HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIGHER LEVELS WHEN HE EXPLAINED THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. HOWEVER, IF THE INTENT WERE TO MAKE A FINAL DEMONSTRATION OF CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT AND NOT SIMPLY TO REVIVE THE ISSUE ONCE AGAIN, THEN HE BELIEVED THE PROPOSAL MERITED FURTHER CONSIDERATION. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY WISHED TO HELP THE CONGRESS CLOSE THIS MATTER IF THAT WAS ITS DESIRE. I SAID THAT WE WOULD HOPE TO RECEIVE A MORE FLEXIBLE ROKG POSITION BUT WE WERE AWARE THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE. AT A MINIMUM, A MEETING WITH THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 06352 02 OF 02 201311Z

CONGRESSMEN WOULD GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT THE ROKG POSITION IN THE BEST LIGHT AND WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP. I TOLD THE FORMIN I WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME FOR HIS FORMAL REPLY.

9. COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO OUR EFFORTS WITH THE FORMIN, THE STATION CHIEF HAS ON MY INSTRUCTION CONVEYED OUR POSITION TO THE DIRECTOR OF KCIA WITH A REQUEST FOR

HIS ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A POSITIVE RESPONSE. ALSO,
PRIOR TO MY INITIAL MEETING WITH THE FORMIN YESTERDAY,
I DISCUSSED THE MATTER AT LUNCH WITH KIM KYONG-WON
OF THE BLUE HOUSE. I WILL GO OVER THESE LATER DEVELOPMENTS
WITH HIM AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW.

10. IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE IS A VERY GREAT RELUCTANCE
TO INVOLVE THE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY IN A MATTER WHICH IS
IN ITSELF EMBARRASSING AND WHERE THE ROKG SEES SUCH
A NARROW SCOPE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. THEY FEAR THE VISIT
WILL AGAIN HIGHLIGHT AND PUBLICIZE AN ISSUE WHICH THE
ROKG FERVENTLY WISHES WOULD GO AWAY.
GLEYSTEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CORRUPTION, BRIBERY, INVESTIGATIONS, CODELS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978SEOUL06352
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840157-2477
Format: TEL
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780738/aaaabflt.tel
Line Count: 237
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: ad5ea66f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 SEOUL 6293, 78 STATE 182550
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1938411
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PROPOSED VISIT TO SEOUL BY CONGRESSMEN HAMILTON AND SPENCE
TAGS: PGOV, OREP, KS, US, (HAMILTON, LEE H), (SPENCE, FLOYD D), (KIM DONG-JO), (PAK TONG-CHIN)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ad5ea66f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014